IC SERIES| Red Sea Red Line: Gray Zone Warfare and the Unspoken War on the West

Where Diplomacy Ends, the Gray War Begins

China’s conduct in the Red Sea and surrounding maritime corridors reveals a deliberate pattern of gray zone warfare, increasingly characterized by the use of military-grade lasers against Western reconnaissance aircraft. In early July 2025, a German surveillance plane operating under the EU’s Aspides mission was forced to abort its flight after a Chinese warship targeted it with a laser, prompting Berlin to summon the Chinese ambassador and condemn the incident as a direct threat to personnel and equipment. This was not an isolated case. Back in 2018, multiple U.S. military aircraft, including C-130s operating out of Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, were struck by laser beams, resulting in injuries to American pilots and formal diplomatic protests. Similar reports have emerged from the East and South China Seas, where U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidons and Australian military aircraft were harassed by laser targeting while conducting routine surveillance. The frequency and consistency of these incidents — typically executed without prior warning, deniability intact — point to a calculated Chinese strategy aimed at degrading the effectiveness of Western ISR operations without provoking open conflict. While not overt acts of war, these encounters escalate tensions and test the resolve of NATO and U.S. forces operating in contested theaters from the Horn of Africa to the Western Pacific.

Gray zone warfare refers to actions by state or non-state actors that fall between traditional war and peace — coercive tactics that remain deliberately ambiguous, designed to avoid triggering direct military retaliation while still achieving strategic objectives. These operations operate below the threshold of armed conflict, exploiting legal, political, and psychological ambiguity to gain an advantage in contested environments.

Rather than using overt force, gray zone strategies rely on hybrid tools, including cyberattacks, economic pressure, disinformation campaigns, proxy forces, territorial encroachments, and non-lethal military provocations, such as laser dazzling of surveillance aircraft, maritime harassment, or satellite jamming. These tactics are often deniable, plausibly legal, or framed as defensive actions, which makes it difficult for targeted nations to respond through conventional military means or international law.

The rise of gray zone warfare illustrates the evolution of modern conflict in a multipolar world where nuclear deterrence, global interdependence, and media scrutiny discourage outright war. Instead, powerful states such as China, Russia, and Iran have adopted the gray zone approach to reshape regional power balances, undermine adversaries, and contest spheres of influence without triggering a full-scale military confrontation. It’s warfare by increments, conducted in slow motion, with the ultimate goal of achieving strategic change before the target even realizes it has occurred.

In the maritime domain, gray zone warfare can involve civilian fishing fleets doubling as militia, unmarked coast guard vessels, or the use of non-lethal laser and radar interference, as seen in incidents in the South China Sea or the Red Sea. In the information space, it manifests as deepfake videos, election interference, and narrative manipulation. Gray zone warfare requires target states to rethink deterrence, legal frameworks, and alliance coordination, because the enemy never quite declares war, but it’s always advancing.

On July 8, 2025, Germany summoned China's ambassador following an incident in the Red Sea where a Chinese warship allegedly targeted a German surveillance aircraft with a laser. The plane was part of the EU's Operation Aspides, aimed at safeguarding international shipping from attacks by Yemen's Houthi rebels. The German Defense Ministry reported that the laser targeting occurred without prior communication, leading to the mission's abortion and the aircraft's safe landing in Djibouti. The German Foreign Office condemned the act as "entirely unacceptable," citing risks to personnel and equipment. China has not yet commented on the incident.

Summoning an ambassador is one of the most serious forms of diplomatic protest short of severing relations — a calibrated but forceful signal that a nation considers the other party’s actions not only unacceptable but dangerously close to an act of aggression. It is not a routine expression of discontent; it is a formal and deliberate act that invokes the full weight of state-to-state relations. In this case, Germany’s decision to summon the Chinese ambassador following the laser targeting of its military aircraft is deeply significant. It indicates that Berlin views the event not as an unfortunate mishap, but as a hostile action—one that risked the lives of its personnel and violated the norms of military engagement.

Such a summons functions as a prelude to escalation, the last diplomatic threshold before more direct responses are considered. In traditional diplomacy, this act is reserved for moments of grave consequence — when a state wishes to warn another that the trajectory of events is spiraling toward confrontation. It establishes a public record, demands accountability, and provides an opportunity for the offending state to de-escalate. But if the pattern persists — as it has with China’s repeated laser incidents involving not only Germany but the U.S., Australia, and others — then each successive summoning erodes the space for peaceful resolution and moves the situation incrementally closer to the realm of retaliatory measures, whether economic, cyber, or kinetic. In this way, summoning an ambassador is not merely symbolic; it is a red flare fired into the darkening sky of international diplomacy — a final invitation to step back from the edge.

China’s Repetitive Use of Lasers In the Region

China has previously been accused of targeting U.S. military aircraft with lasers in the same region, particularly near Djibouti, where both China and the United States maintain military bases just miles apart. The most serious series of incidents occurred between April and May 2018, when the U.S. Department of Defense formally accused Chinese personnel at China’s newly established military base in Djibouti of using military-grade lasers against American aircraft. Specifically, the Pentagon reported that at least two U.S. Air Force C-130 Hercules transport planes had been targeted during operations near Camp Lemonnier, the central U.S. military installation in the Horn of Africa. The laser exposures allegedly caused eye injuries to two U.S. airmen, though the injuries were not permanently disabling.

In response to these incidents, the Pentagon lodged a formal diplomatic protest with the Chinese government, signaling the gravity of the situation. A Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) was issued to warn military and civilian pilots of ongoing “unauthorized laser activity” in the area. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also took the unusual step of issuing an alert, instructing civilian aircraft to take precautionary measures when flying in the region. These were not minor or speculative claims — the actions reflected a coordinated and credible assessment by the U.S. military and civil aviation authorities that hostile laser interference was occurring in critical airspace.

China, however, vehemently denied the allegations, dismissing them as “groundless” and “fabricated.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry publicly maintained that its personnel acted strictly within the bounds of international law and that no such laser activity had been authorized or undertaken by Chinese forces. Despite this denial, the incident marked a significant escalation in the competition between the two powers in the Red Sea region, revealing how non-kinetic weapons, such as lasers, are being employed in contested theaters to challenge rivals while skirting the traditional thresholds of war. In reality, their actions are a deliberate effort to protect their strategic foothold, measured, not overtly aggressive, yet unmistakably rooted in an adversarial posture toward other nations. It’s not pure hostility, but it signals clear boundaries. The United States would be wise to adopt a similar stance, especially when dealing with so-called allies.

China’s Interests in the Red Sea Region

China's interests in the Red Sea region, particularly around Djibouti, are strategic, economic, and military, tightly tied to its global power projection, trade security, and influence expansion.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, is one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints — a narrow passage linking the Mediterranean Sea (via the Suez Canal) to the Indian Ocean, and thereby serving as a vital artery for global commerce. Every day, approximately 6 million barrels of oil and around 10% of all global seaborne trade pass through this corridor. For China, whose economy is heavily reliant on uninterrupted access to foreign markets and energy imports, influence over this strait is not optional — it is a strategic necessity. Positioned at the gateway to East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, the Bab el-Mandeb enables China to secure the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, protect shipping routes central to its Belt and Road Initiative, and exert leverage over a maritime bottleneck that, if disrupted, could send shockwaves through global supply chains. Beijing’s military presence and growing assertiveness in the region — including laser harassment incidents — must be understood through this lens: a calculated effort to defend and dominate a lifeline of commerce, energy, and geopolitical advantage.

China’s military base in Doraleh, Djibouti, established in 2017, represents a historic milestone: it is the first overseas military installation ever built by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Though officially described by Beijing as a “logistics support base” for humanitarian aid, peacekeeping operations, and anti-piracy missions, its capabilities reveal a far more ambitious agenda. The facility is outfitted with a deep-water port, helicopter pads, and a 10,000-foot runway capable of accommodating heavy aircraft, making it a fully functional military hub. Strategically situated near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and just a few miles from the U.S. base at Camp Lemonnier, the Djibouti base enables China to sustain continuous naval operations in the Gulf of Aden and the broader Indian Ocean. More importantly, it marks China's entry into permanent force projection beyond the “First Island Chain,” extending Beijing’s military reach into Africa, the Middle East, and key maritime trade routes. The base is a linchpin in China’s global strategy—both a platform for influence and a shield for its growing overseas interests.

What does “First Island Chain” mean?

The phrase “permanent force projection beyond the First Island Chain” refers to China’s strategic military ambition to extend its operational reach far beyond its immediate coastal waters — into the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and beyond — on a continuous and sustained basis.

The First Island Chain is a geostrategic concept that outlines a string of islands stretching from the Japanese archipelago, through Taiwan, the Philippines, and down to Borneo, forming a natural maritime barrier off China’s eastern coast. Historically, China’s military activities — particularly those of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) — were confined mainly within this boundary. The region within the First Island Chain encompasses the East and South China Seas, areas of intense territorial disputes, and a dense U.S. military presence. Control within this chain is seen by China as vital for homeland defense, protecting its core economic zones, and ensuring access to key sea lanes.

However, “force projection beyond the First Island Chain” means that China is now aiming to break out of this geographic limitation — to operate naval vessels, aircraft, and surveillance platforms regularly in waters such as the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and even parts of the eastern Mediterranean. By establishing overseas bases, such as the one in Djibouti, and through strategic port investments and naval missions abroad, China is transitioning from a regional power to a blue-water navy capable of global reach. The term “permanent” here emphasizes that this isn’t a temporary deployment or show of strength but rather a long-term posture: the infrastructure, logistics, and political presence necessary to sustain military operations thousands of miles from Chinese shores — indefinitely.

China’s sprawling Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) threads through some of the most geopolitically volatile regions on Earth, including East Africa, the Middle East, and up through the Suez Canal, making the Red Sea a vital artery in Beijing’s global economic and strategic blueprint. The BRI is not merely an infrastructure project; it is a vast network of ports, railways, pipelines, and digital corridors designed to bind dozens of countries to China’s trade orbit and political influence. In Djibouti, a key anchor point in this network, China Merchants Group holds significant stakes in the Doraleh Port Terminal, integrating it into Beijing’s broader “string of pearls” strategy — a chain of commercial and military outposts stretching from the South China Sea to East Africa. These hubs serve dual purposes: enabling trade and offering platforms for power projection and contingency operations. The Red Sea, situated at the crossroads of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and Europe, has become more than a transit zone — it is a critical node in China’s strategy to protect its overseas infrastructure, enforce contracts, and manage debt-leveraged partnerships. The presence of PLA forces and strategic interference, such as laser incidents, should be viewed in the context of defending long-term investments with global ramifications.

String of Pearls and India

The “String of Pearls” strategy is a term most commonly used by Indian defense analysts and strategic thinkers to describe China’s growing network of commercial and military facilities along the Indian Ocean littoral, which are seen as part of Beijing’s long-term plan to encircle India and secure its maritime dominance. Though China itself rarely uses the term, the strategy is evident in the pattern of its actions: establishing port infrastructure, forging political ties, and stationing naval assets in countries stretching from the South China Sea to East Africa.